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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to show how inflation is 
endemic to the budgetary process of the United States Federal 
Government. We relate models of government expenditure to 
models of the economy, thus joining in theory what has in 
practice always been together. The description given -- 
although presented in summary rather than detail--is based 
on hard statistical and econometric evidence amassed over more 
than a decade. We attempt to show that, while they are complex, 
the relevant processes can be modelled reasonably simply. We 
conclude that the forces influencing U.S. Federal expenditures -- 
bureaucratic, political and economic --are too entrenched and 
powerful to be easily deflected from their current course. 
Although expenditures decline during restrictive periods, they 
do not decline by nearly as much as they previously increased; 
thus each cycle of spending begins from a higher base. 
After brief descriptions of the process by which fiscal and 
budgetary policy are formed in the name of the President and of 
the evolution of the broad pattern of Federal expenditure post 
World War 11, we present simple, empirically supported models 
of the formation and coordination of budget requests, Congres- 
sional appropriations and the timing of Federal expenditures. 
Next we outline, by means of the comparative static analysis of 
a simple macroeconomic model with an endogenous government sector, 
the short and medium term economic implications of a government 
reacting --through its wage bill, 'mandatory' transfer payments 
and attempted fiscal policy --to output, the price level and 
unemployment. When government involves a sizeable proportion of 
economic activity, its budget deficit--rather than private con- 
sumer and investment credit alone --represents a major inter- 
temporal credit demand, fuelling both growth and inflation. In 
these circumstances a tight fiscal and monetary policy, which 
reduces this credit in response to inflation, can have precisely 
the opposite effect to that desired, namely, simultaneous stag- 
nation and accelerating inflation. Finally, we speculate on the 
long term effects of the resulting growth of the public sector 
necessitated by short term political and economic forces in light 
of the slowly adapting nature of bureaucratic processes captured 
in our models. 
MODELLING THE U.S. FEDERAL SPENDING PROCESS: 
OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS 
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and 
Aaron Wildavsky, Depart~ent of Dolitical Science, 
University of California, Berkeley 
If increased economy and efficiency in the expenditure of 
funds is to be secured, it is thus imperative that the evils 
should be attacked at their source. The only way by which this 
can be done is by placing definite responsibility upon some 
officer of the Government to receive the requests for funds as 
originally formulated by bureau and departmental chiefs and sub- 
jecting them to that scrutiny, revision, and correlation that 
has been described. In the National Government there can be no 
question but that the officer upon whom should be placed this 
responsibility is the President of the United States. 
House Select Committee on the Budget 
(regarding the 1921 Budget and 
Accounting Act) 
H. Rept. No. 14, 67th Congress, 
1st Sess., at 5. 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to show how inflation is en- 
demic to the budgetary process of the United States Federal 
Government. To do this we relate models of government expendi- 
ture to models of the economy, thus joining in theory what has 
in practice always been together. 
The description we shall give --although presented in 
summary rather than detail--is based on hard statistical and 
econometric evidence amassed over more than a decade. We shall 
attempt to show that, while they are complex, the relevant pro- 
cesses can be modelled reasonably simply. We shall conclude 
that the forces influencing U.S. Federal expenditures --bureau- 
cratic, political and economic --are too entrenched and powerful 
to be easily deflected from their current course. Although ex- 
penditures decline during restrictive periods, they do not decline 
by nearly as much as they previously increased; thus each cycle 
of spending begins from a higher base. For empirical detail the 
reader is referred to our forthcoming monograph, The P o l i t i c a l  
Economy o f  P u b l i c  E x p e n d i t u r e .  
To make this paper self-contained, this introduction contains 
very brief descriptions of the process by which fiscal policy 
and the budget are formed in the name of the President and of the 
evolution of the broad pattern of Federal expenditure post World 
War 11. An interesting observation is that both the necessity 
and the opportunity for increased spending arose through the 
exigencies of economic policymaking in the grip of the 'New 
Economics'. 
In the second section we turn to the bureaucratic processes 
by which the Chief Executive receives 'the requests for funds as 
originally formulated by bureau and departmental chiefs' and 
subjects them to 'scrutiny, revision and correlation' before sub- 
mitting them to Congress as formal requests for appropriations. 
Our simple, empirically supported models of the formation and 
coordination of budget requests, appropriations and timing of 
expenditures will be presented in this section. Here we shall 
encounter the powerful influence of momentum. 
Section 3 outlines, by means of the comparative static anal- 
ysis of a simple macroeconomic model with an endogenous govern- 
ment sector, the short and medium term economic implications 
of a government reacting --through its wage bill, 'mandatory' 
transfer payments and attempted fiscal policy --to output, the 
price level and unemployment. Unlike both the established 
Keynesian and Monetarist equivalents, the model is capable, de- 
pending on recognizably plausible parameter configurations, of 
generating a wide range of behaviour --including the evil modern 
phenomenon of 'stagflation'. The message here is that when govern- 
ment involves a sizeable proportion of economic activity, its budget 
deficit --rather than private consumer and investment credit alone -- 
represents a major intertemporal credit demand, fuelling both 
growth and inflation. In these circumstances a tight fiscal and 
monetary policy, which reduces this credit in response to infla- 
tion, can have precisely the opposite effect to that desired, 
namely, simultaneous stagnation and accelerating inflation. 
In the final section of the paper we speculate on the long 
term effects of the resulting growth of the public sector neces- 
sitated by short term political and economic forces. 
Brief Description of the Executive Fiscal Policy and Budget Process I 
The Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 makes the President 
formally responsible for the initiation of an annual budget through 
his staff agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OM!, form- 
erly the Bureau of the Budget, BOB). The preparation and execu- 
tion of the Federal budget for any fiscal year covers at least 
31 months. Each spring, attention is given to: (1) the control 
of (contractual) obligations and outlays (expenditures) during 
the last half of the fiscal year in progress; (2) the planning 
of programs for the upcoming fiscal year, which will begin the 
next October; and (3) the development of preliminary plans and 
policies for the succeeding fiscal year. 
During the time that Congress is considering the budget for 
the imminent fiscal year (October 1 -September 30), the agencies 
In the preparation of the remainder of this section and the 
next we have made extensive use of the work of John P. Crecine 
and his colleagues, Mark Kamlett, David Mowery and Chandler 
Stolp, under the support of NSF Grant SOC-72-05488. We are 
grateful for extensive discussions with them and refer the 
reader to Crecine's work on budgeting processes in the Depart- 
ment of Defense in Volume IV, Appendices: Commission o n  t h e  
Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, 
U.S. Government Printing Office (1975), pp. 63-110, and our 
forthcoming joint paper with Crecine, "Some Structural Char- 
acteristics of the Federal Budgetary Process". We also grate- 
fully acknowledge the support of the Center for Advanced Study 
in the Behavioral Sciences during the academic year 1974-75. 
are preparing estimates of their expenditures for the next year. 
These estimates are compiled by budget officers under the direc- 
tion of agency and departmental heads. Of necessity, estimates 
are detailed, but they may incorporate modifications to take ac- 
count both of the overall Presidential program and possible Con- 
gressional reaction. When complete, they are submitted to OMB. 
There they are reviewed in the light of Presidential plans by 
examiners familiar with the respective agencies. Subsequently, 
hearings allow both agency defense and clarification of estimated 
requirements. During this part of the process, the Director of 
OMB confers frequently with the President and endeavors to keep 
agency requests within Presidential limits. By December, the 
Director presents to the President a consolidated account of ex- 
pected revenues and requested expenditures. Next, under the 
direction of the President, OMB, the Treasury Department and the 
Council of Economic Advisors prepare the budget message. In 
January, the President presents his budget to Congress. 
The Congressional budget process has undergone significant 
changes due to the enactment of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Act in 1972 .* Under this Act, Congress also focusses 
on overall budget totals and relates individual appropriation 
actions to one another within a general set of spending priorities 
To aid in this process, the Act established a new committee on 
the Budget in each House to augment the Appropriations Committees' 
and a new, professionally staffed, Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO). The Act also provides a tight timetable for the new budget 
process and shifted the fiscal year from July 1 through June 30 
to October 1 through September 30, in order to give Congress three 
additional months to complete action on the Federal budget. Note 
that in the new budget cycle which has been in effect since fiscal 
1977 (actual 1975) the timing and nature of the Executive portion 
of the cycle has not changed substantially. 
OMB's role in the Executive budget process has two principal 
phases: a macro planning or 'target setting' phase, called the 
2. For a more complete description see, Preparation and Execution 
of the Federal Budget, Office of Management and Budget, 
November (1976). 
Spring Budget Preview, and a more detailed Director's Review phase 
in which agency budget submissions are examined in detail. At 
the Director's Review in the autumn, requests generated for each 
agency during the planning phase are coordinated in light of 
overall fiscal policy. The principal role of a department is to 
reconcile the requests of its agencies before submission to OMB 
for the Director's Review. The Department of Defense has a process 
for reconciling Service requests similar to that of the Office 
of Management and Budget. 
For at least the past decade, OMB has prepared the necessary 
forecasts and determined agency appropriation and expenditure 
targets in the Spring Preview without any formal input from the 
agencies. The Preview exercise results in a set of plans consis- 
tent with anticipated fiscal policy which OMB produces almost 
entirely internally. Although the Budget Office attempts to set 
aside 2 or 3 percent of the planned budget total for contingencies 
(mostly pay raises) during the Preview, the allocations of budget- 
ary resources have been broadly determined at this point. Without 
changes of total resources available, an increase in any one 
allocation over its target implies a decrease in another. Because 
agencies tend to interpret these OMB ceilings as essentially 
minimum guarantees, it is easy to see that after targets have 
been sent to the agencies any significant increase in a part of 
the total can result in very painful reallocation decisions for 
departments and the Office of Management and Budget. Features 
of the fall Director's Review process are a compression of infor- 
mation and the suppression of detail. 
As might be suspected for a department spending from one-half 
(in the early post-war years) to one-fifth (more recently) of the 
Federal budget, the Department of Defense has a budget process 
essentially separate from --but of course coordinated with --OMB. 
In this process the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in 
particular the Controller's Office under an Assistant Secretary, 
plays the role with regard to the Services that is played by OMB 
with regard to the non-defense agencies and departments. 
The method for determining the defense/nondefense split was 
essentially developed in the decade immediately post World War 11. 
Basically the story is one of deducting, from estimates of rev- 
enues accrued, breakdowns of 'uncontrollable', or fixed expendi- 
tures over which there is little immediate discretion, and con- 
trollable domestic expenditures over which there is some spending 
discretion, to leave the amount available for military expenditure, 
broadly defined. 3 
Estimation is performed by only a very few people --during 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations by the same people over 
a number of years --during a period of a few weeks. We would 
therefore expect various aids to calculation to be employed even 
in the preparation of this simplified aid to Presidential decision- 
making. However simple-minded such aids appear, they can be made 
still easier for the men on the run. Although the resulting 
defense total is subject to appeals by the Department of Defense 
and the Pentagon, the numbers remain relatively fixed over the 
Executive budget cycle. They stay stable because the process 
separates detailed and programmatic responsibility for defense 
and non-defense expenditures between the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense and OMB/BOB over the period from the Spring Preview 
to the October reviews. Because timing is critical to budgeting, 
it is important to recall that these estimates are made eighteen 
to twenty months in advance of the average timing of actual ex- 
penditures in the fiscal year under consideration. Hence we 
should not be surprised that estimates made in the recent past 
are more important for their bearing on events occurring during 
and immediately after their composition than as predictions of 
an uncertain future. Thus the Presidential review of appeals in 
December is less one of policy making than of dispute settling 
in view of changes in fiscal and economic estimates by the Treasury, 
3. During the Kennedy-Johnson era, for political reasons Defense 
Secretary McNamara avoided communicating explicit military 
ceilings during the executive portion of the budget cycle. 
However, it is not clear whether or not implicit military 
totals were used but not reported. See J.P. Crecine, Defense 
Budgeting, Chapt. 7  in R.F. Byrne, A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper, 
O.A. Davis and Dorothy Gifford, eds., Studies in Budgeting, 
North Holland, Amsterdam ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
OMB/BOB, and the Council of Economic Advisors. Indeed, barring 
major changes in foreign policy, the broad lines of Presidential 
policy are fixed during the Spring Preview four to eight quarters 
in advance of the corresponding outlays. Throughout the ensuing 
budget cycle to the submission of the President's budget to Congress, 
adjustments to these broad outlines are relatively marginal in 
light of changing economic and environmental circumstances, and 
detailed adjustments are made in light of the policy advocacy 
process of agencies, Congress and clientele groups in the economy 
and polity. The whole process is one of continual adjustment and 
mutual adaptation of the estimates of various interests within the 
bureaucracy to the final estimates submitted to Congress in the 
President's budget. 
The Post War Increase i n  Expenditure 
In the decade of the fifties, the budget process appeared to 
be working reasonably well--revenue and expenditure were kept 
within hailing distance. Congressmen respected the process; so 
did the Executive. After all, even in fiscal 1961, the Federal 
budget was only about $82 billion, representing some 16 percent 
of the gross national product, a growth of nearly 40 billions 
since fiscal 1951, but only a negligible increase in the propor- 
tion of the GNP. By fiscal 1979, however, the budget has increased 
to a whopping $500 billion and an even larger proportion of the 
GNP to nearly 25 per~ent.~ The late sixties and the seventies 
really represented different eras in budgeting from the decades 
that preceded them. What happened? 
One thing that did not happen was an absolute increase in 
military expenditures. These have remained virtually stable in 
constant dollars since the rundown after the close of the Korean 
War in 1953 --the period of the Vietnam War increasing them only 
temporarily. Thus, the effect of the Truman-Eisenhower-Nixon-Ford 
4. The percentages for earlier years are for the administrative 
Federal budget. Percentages for total outlays, comparable 
to the 1978 (cash consolidated) budget, are 15% of GNP in 
fiscal 1951 and 20% in fiscal 1961. Source: Fiscal 1967 
Budget. 
policy of calculating the first approximation to military expen- 
diture as a residual, and the exigencies of the separate structure 
of military and non-defense calculations within the Executive 
budget process, have resulted in increments in total military 
spending which on average have just kept up with cost increases 
due to wage and price rises. Furthermore, in terms of proportion 
of GNP --which represents the proportion of national resources 
diverted to military spending --this has been relatively constant. 
Although over the post-war period from fiscal 1950 to fiscal 1975 
this proportion has varied from 5 to approximately 13% (at the 
peak of the Korean War) and rose by roughly 3% of GNP during the 
Vietnam War, it has fluctuated about a level of approximately 8% 
over the period. To find the substantial increases in government 
expenditure over the post-war period, we must therefore look 
elsewhere. 
The great increases in public expenditure have come in social 
and welfare expenditures, from a total of about 8 billions in 
fiscal 1965 immediately before LBJ's Great Society programs,to 
168 billions in fiscal 1975 --over a four fold increase in real 
terms.  his is only to say that there was a marked agreement 
within the country that expenditures on human resources should 
rise and that this consensus has been reflected in Congressional 
appropriations and subsequent Federal expenditures. 5 
The 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a series of struggles 
over the size and scope of government spending, as the political 
forces behind spending grew far more powerful. Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson and Nixon, in spite of initiating increased spending, 
wanted to a p p e a r  financially responsible. Whether it was Johnson's 
effort to come in below $100 billion, or Nixon's at no more than 
$200 billion, they promoted their announced targets publicly. 
Executive interplay with Congress became a game to shift respon- 
sibility to the other branch for cutting or failing to cut ex- 
penditures. The size of budgets became as never before part of 
5. See Aaron Wildavsky, S p e a k i n g  T r u t h  t o  Power: T he  A r t  and 
C r a f t  o f  P o l i c y  A n a l y s i s  (Little, Brown, 1979). Chapter 4, 
'Coordination Without a Coordinator'. 
political strategy. Successive governments, therefore, whatever 
their announced orientation to spending, have found it imperative 
to make the deficit look smaller either by making revenues look 
larger or expenditures lower or both. 
Economics (or, at least, economists) came to the rescue. 
The increasing importance of economics in government has provided 
doctrinal aid --sometimes on purpose, other times by accident-- 
for higher levels of spending. The consolidated budget, the nature 
of the forecasting exercise for fiscal policy making itself and 
the concept of the full employment surplus --all inventions of 
economists --simultaneously strove to justify higher spending and 
to make it appear lower. 
By far the most important of the specific devices for in- 
creasing government spending mentioned above has been the abandon- 
ment of the norm of the balanced budget by President ~ixon in the 
fiscal 1972 budget in favor of a less restrictive one. The 
idea that Federal budgets ought to be balanced was widely accepted 
in the United States, even after the Keynesian revolution in thought, 
through the administrations of Democrat Harry Truman and Republican 
Dwight Eisenhower. Life was simple (outside of wartime) and cash 
control was exercised; expenditures were monies the regular govern- 
mental departments paid out and revenues were taxes collected. 
A deficit, then, meant a cash difference between ordinary revenue 
and expenditure; what was ordinary was sanctified as much by usage 
and custom as by formal definition. When the government took in 
as much cash as it paid out, the budget was balanced. Keynesian 
economic theory was interpreted to mean that a temporary Federal 
deficit could stimulate the economy at a downturn of the business 
cycle, but the cash loss would be recovered at the subsequent peak 
as a revenue surplus. In the long run --in theory --no increase 
in the public debt need be sustained; economic debate centred on 
the effectiveness and timing of this counter-cyclical policy. 
Whereas Presidents Truman and Eisenhower believed in the norm 
of the balanced budget and acted on their beliefs, Presidents 
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon abandoned these beliefs and acted ac- 
cordingly. The direct mechanism for superseding the older norm 
was called the full employment deficit. In a word, this doctrine 
meant that federal expenditures should rise to the point that 
would have been justified if the nation's economy had been at full 
employment. Under the new interpretation of Keynesian theory, 
the difference between this full employment level and current 
revenues would be the appropriate Federal deficit to impart exactly 
the right stimulus to the economy to achieve full employment. 
A cash surplus under these conditions is most unlikely, especially 
since Kennedy established the precedent of cutting tax rates to 
go along with it. The extent of the permissible deficit, however, 
was rather vague, depending as it did on whatever level of un- 
employment was considered too high, and whatever calculations 
were judged to provide an approximation of full employment. The 
cash balanced budget was not only regarded as unnecessary and 
theoretically undesirable, but 'balance' at the full employment 
level, rather than at a recognizable particular point, was in 
practice becoming a rather sizeable range. Keynesian thought 
was now interpreted to mean that the budget should be balanced 
at expenditures that would provide sufficient stimulation to 
create full employment at whatever level was designated as being 
full. Might this blissful full employment state come about? 
Not never, perhaps, but hardly ever; and yet apparently paradox- 
ically a cash s u r p l u s  --coupled with a tight monetary policy -- 
wreaked havoc on the economy in 1969-70 and again in 1974-75.  
From the perspective of theoretical economic management, 
the new economic concepts no doubt represent improvements, but 
from the point of view of political management of expenditure, 
the proposition is doubtful. It is a matter of distinguishing 
between economic and political rationality. From an economic 
point of view, for example, it makes substantive sense to index 
social security contributions so as to mitigate the effects of 
inflation by recipients. But if one realizes that Congressmen 
love to vote increases, so that protection against inflation is 
likely to be achieved first, followed by repeated increases, the 
political economist of social security might have advocated a 
different approach. In the same way, the political economist 
of Federal expenditures might have preferred to keep separate 
accounts for economic purposes rather than compromising an 
essentially political document --the budget of the United States 
Federal government --with economic accounting concepts that bias 
the results in the direction of increased spending. Of course, 
if one wants increased spending, then what has been done is not 
only correct but creative. 
'Playing politics' with the budget is what everyone does, 
and should do, in a democratic polity. 'Politics' once included 
the expectation that voters would apply sanctions if unbalanced 
budgets were regularly submitted. Thus, in the past, significant 
departures from the norm of a balanced budget placed informal but 
real limits on the amount of manipulation that could take place 
in order to get past the next election or to maintain or increase 
popularity in the short run. This restraint no longer applies. 
If Presidents wish to avoid the appearance of confrontation be- 
tween policies of 'guns or butter' (or to spend largesse before 
election day), their possibilities are multiplied. Who, after 
all, can say how large the full employment deficit might appro- 
priately be or what the margin of error in the total actually is 
or what the level of deficit would have to be to know that the 
political impact had become too large? In this way, inflation 
under the impetus of increased spending has been built into the 
budgetary process to a much larger degree than was heretofore the 
case. 
Now in the past it has been argued that long-run interests 
in holdinq down spending have been sacrificed to short-term inter- 
ests in gaining the approval of beneficiaries. The norm of the 
balanced budget, however, limited how much of this could be done 
at any one time. When President Johnson discovered that almost 
everyone was interested in new obligational authority, that is, 
the amount appearing in the budget in a particular year, rather 
than in future obligations incurred under the corresponding 
authorization, another past restraint in the budgetary process 
was loosened. Present reductions could be traded for future in- 
creases. Spending in relation to revenue over the past two 
decades has in fact been made less rather than more accountable, 
hence less controllable. 6 
6. For an excellent discussion of controllability see Barry M. 
Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich and Robert W. Hartman, Budget 
controllability and planning, Cha~ter 7 of Setting National 
Priorities, The 1976 Budget, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington D.C. (1976), 190-230. 
We must understand that what is or is not considered a con- 
trollable expenditure --hence subject to discretion, hence part 
of the budget that can be changed --is a subjective and not an 
objective definition. The important point is that uncontrollable 
is not the same as unchangeable. It remains true, as it always 
has been, that budgets are made by people and can be changed by 
them. It may take a few years (a ten percent increase a year 
amounts to over a hundred percent in seven years) but if we are 
interested in the cumulative results of budgetary processes, little 
is left that human beings cannot change. 
2. MODELLING THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROCESS: INCREMENTALISM, 
COORDINATION AND THE PROPORTIONAL CUT 
Despite the complexities of the Federal budget and expendi- 
ture processes the immediate forces behind the growth of the 
United States Government can be reasonably simply and accurately 
modelled. In this section we introduce empirically supported:- 
1. Micro-models of appropriation formation --taking as 
basic unit major agencies and departments in OMB 
Divisions and including external economic, social and 
political influences operating through the Executive, 
President and Congress. 
2. Models of non-market coordinating mechanisms --Office 
of Management and Budget procedures by which agency 
appropriation requests are fitted within current 
fiscal constraints. 
3. Distributed lag spending models --to represent the 
timing of actual agency and departmental outlays 
from appropriated funds. 
In the next section we shall describe a simple macroeconomic model 
and use it to analyse the effects of Presidential policymaking 
interacting with bureaucratic and Congressional upwards spending 
pressures (represented in the models of this section) to generate 
a public policy induced economic cycle. 
7 Rather than present detailed econometric estimates , it will 
suffice here to set out the basic models together with a brief 
description of their empirical support. We begin with a verbal 
description of the models developed in our earliest work which 
investigated the correspondence of simple two-equation models -- 
based on considerations of limited rationality in the face of 
complexity and uncertainty --to the appropriate budgeting behavior 
of 116 domestic agencies, large and small, over the period fiscal 
1947 to fiscal 1963. The basic model for an individual agency 
stated that (up to mutually and serially independent disturbances 
representing non-recurring events specific to respectively the 
demand and supply of funds): 
Executive requests on behalf of an agency were a 
proportional mark-up of the previous years appro- 
priation, while the corresponding CongressionaZ 
appropriation was a simple proportion of the 
Presidential estimate (request), 
8 
usually, of course --but not always --a mark-down. Although the 
incremental behavior specified by these models of the appropria- 
tions process for an individual agency appeared to be the general 
rule, a major finding concerned the nature of the exceptions. 
For many agencies, epochs in which the underlying incremental 
relationships appeared to change were identified statistically; 
a subset of these epochs was investigated by documentary analysis 
and the major influences at work on the corresponding agencies 
classified. While some of these influences were essentially random 
7. See Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky, A 
theory of the budgetary process, Amer.Politica2 Sci. Rev. 60 
(1966), 529-47; On the process of budgeting: An empirical 
study of Congressional appropriation, Papere in Non-Market 
Decision Making 1 (1966), 63-132; On the process of budgeting 
11: An empirical study of Congressional appropriation, Chapt. 9 
in R.F. Byrne, A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper, O.A. Davis and Dorothy 
Gifford, eds., Studies in Budgeting, North Holland, Amsterdam 
(1971); Towards a predictive theory of government expenditure: 
U.S. domestic appropriations, British J. Political S c i . - 5  
(1974), 419-452, and our forthcoming monograph. 
8. Outstanding exceptions in the fiscal 1947-63 period were the 
National Institutes of Health and NASA. 
and non-recurring, most could be seen to be due to specific 
political, or general economic or social events. This suggested 
that, although it is basically incremental, the budget process 
does respond to the needs of the economy and society, but only 
after sufficient pressure has built up to cause a b r u p t  changes 
precipitated by events. 9 
Next we attempted to model this extended notion of the nature 
of the budget process at agency level by incorporating a number 
of political, economic and social exogenous variables into our 
earlier model in such a way as to preserve the behavioral inter- 
pretation of its coefficients. The explanatory variables for 
these extended micro models are set out in Table 1. The models 
were estimated over the fiscal 1947-63 period for a representative 
selection of 53 agencies from our previous 116. Confidence in 
the validity of an econometric model can only be justified by 
successful performance in prediction --both ex post (after the 
fact) and ex a n t e  in genuine forecasting. We therefore analysed 
the increase in level of explanation of the budget process ob- 
tained by the extended model in terms of some reasonable criteria 
for evaluating ex post prediction over the five-year post-estima- 
tion period fiscal 1964-68. We also compared the predictive 
performances over this period of the extended model and various 
obvious or naive alternatives for predicting appropriations -- 
current Presidential budget estimate (request), previous appro- 
priation and an autoregressive model for appropriations. The 
exogenous shocks causing abrupt changes in the incremental dynam- 
ics of the budget process for a single agency were modelled with 
some degree of success in prediction (both absolutely and vis-a- 
vis naive alternatives) by the introduction of a statistically 
significant subset of the exogenous political, social and economic 
variables. But the Executive side of the process performed poorly 
for predictive purposes. We set out, therefore, to uncover the 
cause of the difficulty and to improve our models of Executive 
action. 
9. For a discussion of the implications of this effect for the 
concept of incrementalism, see our On Change: Or, there is 
no magic size for an increment, PoliticaZ Studies, - 27 (1979), 
371-389. 
Table 1 
EqZanatory VariabZes i n  the KcmmodeZs 
Extended t o  EqZain Exogenous Influences 
Process 
LV Leadi ng v a r i  abl  e E i t h e r  agency request  (es t imate i n  
Pres i  dent 's  budget message) x i  
(endogenous), o r  f i s c a l  appropr ia t ion  
- .  i n  p ~ v i o u s  year  y t - 1  (pre-determined) . 
( Y - x ) ~ - ~  D i f fe rence  between request  and appropr i  a- 
t i o n  i n  t h e  prev ious f i s c a l  year. 
Pol i t i c a l  
1. HND 
2. NLND 
3. HDM 
4. HLDM 
5. SDM 
6. RP 
7. PRE-EL 
Admi n i  s t r a t i  ve 
House non-southe,rn 
Democrats 
House l a r g e  non- 
southern Democrats 
House Democratic 
m a j o r i t y  
House 1 arge Democrat 
m a j o r i t y  
Senate Democratic 
m a j o r i t y  
Republ i can Pres iden t  
Pre-el e c t i  on year  
Non-southern ( i n c l u d i n g  western) 
Democrats h o l d  between 100 and 150 
seats i n  t h e  House o f  Representatives. 
Non-southern democrats h o l d  over 150 
seats i n  t h e  House. 
Democrats ho.ld between 21 7 and 250 
seats i n  t h e  House. 
Democrats h o l d  over 250 seats i n  t h e  
House. 
Democrats ho ld  50 o r  more seats i n  
the  Senate. 
- 
F isca l  yea r  o f  P res iden t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
(dated one year  subsequent t o  e l e c t i o n  
year) .  
-
8. B.DEF-l Budget d e f i c i t  i n  Previous f i s c a l  year  est imated i n  sur-  
previous f i s c a l  year  p l u s  (0 )  o r  d e f i c i t  ( 1 )  by t h e  Council 
o f  Economi c Advi sors , as announced i n  
t h e  cu r ren t  Pres ident 's  budget message 
i n  January. 
9. PBRR Pro jec ted  budget Estimate o f  adrni n i  s t r a t i v e  budget re- 
r ece ip t s  r a t i o  c e i p t s  f o r  t h e  coming f i s c a l  year  d i v i ded  
by t h e  est imate f o r  t h e  previous f i s c a l  
year  a t  t h e  t ime o f  t he  s i x  month review 
i n  December (Kessel).  
Economi c 
10. EC.REC Economic recession 
11. UER Unemployment r a t e  
12. RNNP Real Net Nat iona l  
Product 
13. GNPD GNP D e f l a t o r  
14. FPPR Federal / p r i  va te  p r i  ce 
r a t i o  
Soci a1 
F i sca l  year  judged a recession year  by 
Counci 1 i n  a subsequent budget message. 
5 percent  i s  1.00. 
Net na t i ona l  product  d e f l a t e d  by t h e  
p r i v a t e  p r i c e  index per  head o f  a d u l t  
pbpul a t i  on (Ni  skanen) . F71 i s  1 .OO 
F58 i s  1.00 
Rat io  o f  federa l  government t o  p r i v a t e  
p r i c e  index (Ni s kanen) . 
15. WAR - Nat ion a t  war (dec lared o r  de facto) .  
16. AFO Armed forces overseas A two year  ( t  and t + l )  moving average of 
armed forces overseas per head of a d u l t  
popula t ion x 102 (Ni  skanen) . 
17. YPR Young popul a t i  on Rat io  o f  young t o  a d u l t  popula t ion 
r a t i o  
18. ADP Adul t  popu la t ion  s!tn?!h6. 
It was first necessary to confirm these findings by extending 
the data period. Comparison of model performance over two periods 
resulted in better fits in the longer estimation period (fiscal 
1948-67) for the agency equation, and comparable fits over both 
estimation periods for the Congressional equation. Best speci- 
fications in terms of significant exogenous variables changed only 
marginally between the two periods. Over the second prediction 
period (fiscal 1968-72), prediction by both equations --and hence 
prediction of appropriations by the system --improved markedly. 
This finding held both absolutely, and relative to the naive al- 
ternatives. Given good Congressional results, the earlier con- 
clusion that request prediction was the key to good system pre- 
diction remained unchanged. When our predictions for requests 
by Executive agencies worked well, so did our predictions for the 
budgetary process as a whole. 
Though they were not allowed in the earlier behavioral speci- 
fications, constant terms entered significantly into the specifi- 
cation of our new micromodels, even after we introduced exogenous 
variables. To see what was wrong, we suppressed the constant 
terms, and simultaneously re-entered an intertemporal gaming term, 
represented by the previous year's cut (or increase) on the agency 
requests, into both the Executive and Congressional equations. 
The results were a considerable increase in the number of cases 
of significance of the inter-year gaming term, together with a 
large increase in explanation of agency appropriations by extended 
equations containing exogenous variables. We interpreted this as 
strong evidence for the behavioral specifications of our micro- 
agency equations in terms of agency 'mark-ups' and Congressional 
'mark-downs'. 
When, contrary to the behavioral specification, a constant 
term is significant, the main reason is either that key variables 
have been omitted or that non-linearities are present. Since the 
latter explanation was explicitly tested and found wanting, and 
the introduction of exogenous variables had not significantly 
improved the fit or predictive power of our agency equations, our 
findings so far indicated that the omission of behavioral variables 
was the more likely explanation. Since our Congressional equations 
performed well, it became all the more imperative for us to re- 
examine the Executive side of the process. 
If, as we surn~ised, external variables entered our equations 
mainly through the Congressional side of the process, and internal 
variables operate mainly through the ~xecutive, the missing factor 
was likely to be a relationship among relevant organizations. 
It was inappropriate to continue to study individual agency re- 
quests in isoZation. Indeed, as we have seen, not only OMB, but 
also the major departments such as Defense, Agriculture, Interior, 
etc., are charged with relating the various requests of their 
services and agencies to the President's over-all interests -- 
especially fiscal policy. We had omitted rules used by central 
Executive organizations for regulating their internal relation- 
ships; to add to explanation and prediction we needed models of 
inter-agency coordination within the Executive. Since our new 
agency models explicitly incorporated major political, economic 
and social considerations into the budgetary behavior relating 
to an individual agency, we were able to perform and classify 
inter-agency comparisons of these influences. We found that gen- 
eral services provided by large agencies (including the Public 
Health Service, together with natural resource agencies) are most 
susceptible to political influences. On the other hand economic 
variables were usually found to influence non-controversial ap- 
propriations, such as the Commodity Exchange Authority and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service; indirect evidence for the 
application of fiscal policy considerations within the Executive 
budget process. 
The most fruitful approach to modelling the coordinating be- 
havior required of the Executive process appeared to us to be an 
effort to create a more sophisticated version of the fair share 
hypothesis --the often-expressed belief among Executive practi- 
tioners that agencies should be treated not only by their program- 
matic merits, but also with regard to their organizational needs, 
so that all agencies concerned should receive some portion of the 
distributed goods (increases) or bads (decreases). After all, 
if agencies were treated in terms of their merits, this would 
10. See Aaron Wildavsky, The PoZitics of the Budget Process, 
Little, Brown, Boston (1975). 
lead to precipitous increases and decreases as political leader- 
ship or public fashion changed. Putting oneself in the other's 
place suggests it is worth being fair --winning less one year to 
lose less another. Besides, knowledge to ascertain effectiveness 
may be lacking. Calculations may be conserved, therefore, by 
treating all agencies equally well or badly. Now we could model 
the 'fair' coordinating relationships between bureaus and depart- 
ments by which the environmental influences, represented by the 
exogenous variables, are modified to suit internal organizational 
needs. Preliminary tests of this inter-agency Executive coordi- 
nating mechanism --the proportional cut, to be described below-- 
were made on the Post Office and the major appropriations cat- 
egories of the Defense Department. As a result it became clear 
that certain sub-agencies and appropriations categories were 
treated as uncontrollable and exempted from the fair share treat- 
ment, while minor ones were lumped together for the calculation 
of shares. 
Like departments that must bring the total of their agency 
requests within target figures both before and after the fall 
Review, the Director of OMB must bring the major agencies and 
departments within a fiscal total late in the autumn, see Table 2. 
Moreover, we have seen that in spite of the enormous programmatic 
complexities and vast sums of money involved, very few people 
deal with the required reconciliations in very short periods of 
time. To quote an early account by ~osher", 'Some budget offices 
can make "flash" budget estimates almost overnight within 3 or 4 
percent of complete accuracy [of final requests]'. Departmental 
budgeting officers have a few weeks in September and October; 
analysts in OMB have a few weeks in October and November, and 
staff of the Comptroller's Office in the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense have a similar period at the same time. 
Thus in developing a model of the inter-agency coordination 
process we should be looking for a simplified rule of thumb by 
which collective resources may be fairly allocated across agencies. 
Given past discussion of civilian and military executive budget 
processes, we might expect that the essential mechanism of such 
1 1 .  Mosher, I?., Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice (Chicago: 
Public Administration Service, 1954), p.239. 
Table 2 
* 
Major t h z i h  in O M  Divisions Studied 
Funds Appropr iated t o  the  Pres ident  
A g r i c u l t u r e  
Come r ce  
Defense--Mi 1 i t a r y  
Army Corps o f  Engineers 
Heal th ,  Education and We1 f a r e  
Housing & Home Finance Agency (1  955-1 965) 
i . e. Housing & Urban Development ( 1  966-1973) 
I n t e r i o r  
Jus t i ce  
Labor 
Transpor ta t ion (1  967-1973) 
Treasury 
Sta te  
Atomi c Energy Commi s s i  on 
General Services Admin is t ra t ion  
Nat iona l  Aeronautics & Space Admin is t ra t ion 
Veterans Admin is t ra t ion  
C i  v i  1 Serv i  ce Comi  s s i  on 
Rai 1 road Retirement Board 
Post O f f i  ce Department ( 1  955-1 968)/Postal Serv ice (1 969-1 973) 
Federal Avi a t i  on Adnii n i s  t r a t i  on 
A1 1 Other (Residual f rom non-defense t o t a l  ) 
* 
The data was k i n d l y  provided t o  us by Professor  Crecine i n  
1975 a t  the Center f o r  Advanced Study i n  the  Behavioral 
Sciences. It came o r i g i n a l l y  from OMB sources, O f f i c e  o f  
Budget Review, and was obtained and analysed i n  de ta i  1 by 
Professor Creci  ne and h i s  coworkers--Mark Kaml e t ,  David 
Mowery , John Padgett and Chandler St01 p--under NSF G r a n t  
SOC 72-05488. 
an allocation process would be incremental. Indeed, the emphasis 
in both processes is on squeezing a sum of agency requests under 
a projected total --that is to say, in distributing a total cut 
across exaggerated agency requests to result in some increment 
over previous appropriations for all. Since such a process is 
bound to be highly political within the bureaucracy, it should 
not be surprising that a rule of thumb would be used which would 
minimize conflict through being seen by the participants as 'fair'. 
Assume that a Department Secretary assisted by his staff, has 
identified his policy preferences for his department and would 
like to implement them. Although problems of the relative in- 
fluence of his agencies with respect to the President, Congress 
and their respective clientele arise immediately, it is usual 
- - 
practice 12 
for a high departmental official to lay the 
whole budget down in front of the bureau 
heads in an effort to explain why they cannot 
get any more than their share despite the fact 
that their programs are eminently deserving. 
Some budget officials are extremely talented 
at cutting without getting the blame. [Italics 
added] 
The necessity for a simple 'fair' mechanism was pointed out 
1 3 .  in The Politics of the Budgetary Process more than a decade ago . 
'Fair share' means not only the base an agency 
has established but also the expectation that 
it will receive some portion of the funds, if 
any, which are to be increased over or de- 
creased below the base of the various govern- 
mental agencies. 'Fair share1, then, reflects 
a convergence of expectations on roughly how 
much the agency is to receive in comparison to 
others. [Italics added] 
The absence of ... an agreement upon fair 
shares makes the calculation of what the program 
or agency should get much more difficult. That 
happens when an agency or problem is new or when 
rapid shifts of sentiment toward it take place. 
However, the recent operationalization of the notion of 'fair 
shares' as an incremental non-market mechanism for the allocation 
12 .  Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 35.  
13.  Yildavsky, op.c<t., p. 17.  
of scarce resources within an organization, is due to Crecine and 
Fischer following an important, but generally overlooked, contri- 
bution of Shubik. ' In a pioneering study1 of the Executive 
budget process within the Department of Defense, Crecine and 
Fischer proposed that the overall cut to total service requests 
occasioned at the fall Secretary's Review should be distributed 
across appropriations categories in proportion to each category's 
share of the total. This was the abstract inter-agency allocation 
rule proposed by Shubik in his single time period game-theoretic 
analysis of the central organization competing agencies budget 
game. Although their analyses are responsible for the 'propor- 
tional cut' model, which we shall develop mathematically below, 
it is interesting to note that both contributions considered this 
allocation mechanism only a temporary expedient. As Crecine and 
16 Fischer say , 
Earlier ... we argued that different budget 
accounts should be more or less vulnerable 
to additional cuts. In preliminary tests of 
the model, however, we made the simplifying 
assumption that additional cuts or restorations 
are allocated in proportion to planning fore- 
casts ... Future versions of the model will 
be based on the more reasonable assumption 
that the various appropriations categories 
are differently sensitive to additional ad- 
justments beyond the planning stage. [Italics 
added] 
Their 'simplifying assumption' is --as the quotation from The 
Politics of the Budgetary Process suggests --our theory. 
The context is calculation: the Executive budget authority 
must be able to reduce agency bids (mark down their markups, as 
we have said) in a simple, speedy and perceivably fair manner. 
14. Shubik, Martin, 'Budgets in a decentralized organization 
with incomplete organization', Report P-4514, Rand Corpor- 
ation, Santa Monica, December (1970). 
15. Crecine, J.P. and Gregory Fischer, 'On resource allocation 
processes in the U.S. Department of Defense', Discussion 
Paper, University of Michigan, Institute of Public Policy 
Studies, October (1 971 ) . 
16. Crecine and Fischer, op.cit., p. 57. 
We would expect to find, therefore, that cuts are (a) proportional 
to the requested increase and (b) applied to the largest agencies 
or appropriations accounts (with smaller ones aggregated for con- 
venience) that are (c) controllable without changing legislation. 
Reductions, if our hypothesis is correct, fall disproportionately 
on major categories and agencies that are controllable in the 
short run, such as military personnel, or that limit spending 
possibilities a few months later, like surveys preparatory to 
construction. Political pressure for increased spending is coun- 
tered by pushing back the d e t a i l e d  allocation of reductions on 
the apencies. After all, the President and his OMB know where to 
expect constant political pressure, especially where Congress is 
likely to mark up, so it is only natural they should begin by 
marking down. Budgeting is not a single act, but a series of 
reactions in which each participant is aware of the tendencies 
of the other. 
We shall shortly set out the proportional cut model formally 
as a means by which a central planning agency can reconcile indi- 
vidual requests by program or sub-agency. For a domestic depart- 
ment, this reconciliation will be done in two stages, by the 
department and OMB. Even if the rule is in operation at both 
stages, however, especially when the department must subsequently 
allocate OPlB cuts (or increases) amongst its agencies, we might 
nevertheless expect to effectively apply it just once to improve 
our estimates of the President's budget requests over our earlier 
micro-models for individual agencies or departments within OMB's 
Divisions as listed in Table 2. 
Let us first set out the general model for the President's 
budget request, for the ith agency, xitI which is to be applied 
to an 'uncontrollable' agency or department, i.e. one exempted 
from the proportional cut, uiz. 
Here the zit's, j = l,...,k, represent observations on the exo- 
genous variables (see Table 1) which influence the 'mark-up' or 
the previous year's appropriation y t-1 in the current fiscal yeart; 
the term in (y-x) t-l represents intertemporal gaming behavior of 
the agency with respect to Congress; and Sit is a random distur- 
bance to the relationship representing non-recurring special 
circumstances. 
Alternatively, for the ith OMB major unit --agency or de- 
partment--subject to the proportional cut, requests dit to the 
October OMB Director's Review in fiscal year t are given by an 
equation similar to (1 ) , v i z .  
Define x to be the total non-defense request in the President's t 
budget for the m agencies subject to the proportional cut in 
fiscal year t and let 
represent the total request for these agencies to the Director's 
Review. In general we would expect that 
i . e .  t h a t  t h e  sum o f  agency  and d e p a r t m e n t  r e q u e s t s  n o r m a l l y  f a r  
e x c e e d s  t h e  f i s c a l  t a r g e t  f o r  n o n - d e f e n s e  u n i t s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  c u t .  
For the ith agency subject to the proportional cut, the request 
x in the President's budget will be given by the proportional it 
cut model in fiscal year t as 
t h  i.e., t h e  approved  r e q u e s t  f o r  t h e  i agency  i s  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e -  
q u e s t  m i n u s  [ p l u s ]  t h a t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c u t  [ i n c r e a s e ]  
r e q u i r e d  t o  m e e t  t h e  c e n t r a l  o r g a t z i z a t i o n ' s  b u d g e t  t a r g e t  g i v e n  
by  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  i n i t i a l  r e q u e s t  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e q u e s t  
t o t a l .  
Rearranging slightly yields 
i.e., the approved budget request for the ith agency is that 
proportion of the central organization's budget target given by 
the proportion of its initial request in the initial request 
total. 
Thus the central organization --OMB --returns to each agency 
or department an approved allocation in such a way as to make the 
total of the individual allocations approved sum to a desired 
target total (usually an increase over the total in the previous 
year's budget). The approved allocations can be generated rapidly, 
so that little attention need be given to the programs behind 
individual agency requests, and 'fairly', in order to minimize 
dissonance from the agency actors in the process, both vis-a-vis 
each other and with the central organization. 
The proportional cut model works as well in the case of a 
rapid and 'fair' allocation of a target surplus by the central 
organization to the agencies as in the more usual case of a cut 
below requested totals. It is of course incremental; both in 
that it takes as basic data the initial agency requests, and in 
that the current budget target is usually incrementally related 
to the actual budget total in the previous year. 
Equations (3) and (4) constitute an application of the basic 
proportional cut model for the allocation of a single cut by the 
central organization to the inflated total of agency budget re- 
quests. We are of course interested in applying the model to 
improve our prediction of annual major OMB unit requests in the 
President's budget. But first we must report an empirical test 
of the assumption implicit in this approach to modelling the 
President's budget request for a major OMB unit subject to the 
proportional cut, namely, that 
up to changes due to non-recurring events 
(represented by a random disturbance term) 
the Budget Director's recommendations are 
those appearing in the President's budget. 
Regressions of President's Budget figures on the Director's mark 
over the fiscal period 1955-73 for the agencies and departments 
listed in Table 2 support the view that the Director's mark es- 
sentially embodies Presidential economic and political policy 
decisions. 
Thus the use of the proportional cut model to represent the 
effect of the fall Director's Review on agency and department 
submissions, dit, is justified, providing we can ascertain a 
priori which major OMB units are subjected to the proportional 
cut. This was done by using the actual data, rather than estimates 
based on our Executive models, to ascertain for which configura- 
tions of agencies the proportional cut improved the statistical 
relationship between OMB unit submissions to the fall review and 
the corresponding President's budget figures. The results for 
the estimation period (fiscal 1956-68) and the post-unified budget 
prediction period (fiscal 1969-73) and their interpretations are 
displayed in Table 3. 
For the agencies listed in Table 3 as outside the propor- 
tional cut, our original model (1) was estimated and used to 
generate predictions of requests over the prediction period as 
before. However, for the remaining major units of Table 2, the 
model of Review request formation (2) was estimated and used to- 
gether with the proportional cut model (4) relating to the appro- 
priate agencies to generate the President's budget request pre- 
dictions over the fiscal 1969-73 period. 
In both cases Congressional appropriation predictions were 
generated by estimating the model which had proved successful in 
earlier studies, uiz. 
After statistically insignificant coefficients were rejected, 
the fit and predictive power of these models for the major OMB 
units listed in Table 2 was significantly improved over compar- 
able earlier studies. This was due to the use of the proportional 
cut models to coordinate relevant agency requests. We may con- 
clude that the proportional cut, together with our earlier models 
Table 3 
Agencies and Departments Not Subjected t o  the 
Froportional Cut a t  the OMB Directors Review 
Fiscal 1956-68 
J u s t i c e  
S t a t e  
Treasury 
AEC 
NASA 
Veterans 
Admi n i  s t r a t i  on 
Any  Corps 
o f  Engineers 
Fi sca l  1969-73 
J u s t i c e  
Premiere Deparkenb S t a t e  
Treasury 
Cold War AEC 
Space Race NASA 
Veterans 
Admini s t r a t i o n  
Army Corps 
of  Engineers 
HEW 
Commerce 
Great SocieQ 
LB J/flixon 
Business 
I n t e r e s b  
for 'uncontrollable' units, is a reasonable representation of 
OMB's inter-agency coordination function. 
Finally, following Galper and wendell' ' , the distributed lag 
model 
where zit represents actual outlays for fiscal year t, was found 
to be adequate to represent actual agency and department disburse- 
ments from appropriations yi. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis of fixed lags in the timing of actual disburse- 
ments from given Congression appropriations for individual 
agencies. 
Moreover, in the estimation of both executive and legislative 
models for generating appropriations few pre-election variables 
were found to be significant. l 8  Thus it would appear that there 
is little evidence for either classical Keynesian demand tuning 
by the U.S. Government or a political business cycle induced by 
pre-electiqn spending. Appropriations do not appear to vary 
either to dampen oscillations in the business cycle --we shall 
in fact argue that causality runs the other way--or to increase 
spending to help incumbent Presidents in pre-election years. 
Pre-election spending therefore appears to be restricted to 
effects of outlay timing --of necessarily limited impact. 
17. Harvey Galper 4 Helmut F. Ifilendell, Progress in forecasting 
the Federal budget, Proc. Economics & Business Section 
Amer. Statistical Society (1968), p. 86-98. 
18. In Collat's study of corporate and individual tax revenue, 
a similar conclusion was reached. See Donald S. Collat, 
Voting Behaviour and the Formation of Tax Policy. D-Phil. 
Thesis, University of Oxford (1978), Chapts. 6, 7 & 8. 
19. See, for example, William D. Nordhaus, The political busi- 
ness cycle, Rev. of Economic Studies 42 (1975), 169-190; 
-
Bruno S. Frey 4 Friedrich Schneider, On the modelling of 
politico-economic interdependence, European J. of Political 
Res. 3 (1975), 339-360; and Edward R. Tufte, Political 
Control of the Economy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton (1 978) . 
At the risk of some oversimplification, let us reconsider 
the Keynesian verities as they have been popularized, for that 
is the form in which politicians are most likely to be influenced 
by them. An attractive feature is that there are only two de- 
cision rules that matter: save and spend. When there is economic 
expansion, government lowers spending to reduce demand and when 
the economy is contracting, the government raises spending to 
increase demand. So far so good. But government itself, the 
main actor in this drama, is left out. Curiously, the economy, 
which is the passive recipient of all this attention, is modelled, 
but government, the active element, is not. Thus the prime passive 
assumption --that the economy would respond with an acceptable 
tradeoff between employment and inflation --has been much studied, 
of course, and lamentably, the active assumption --that government 
could raise and lower spending at will--has remained unexamined. 
What could we learn by applying our microspending models to dif- 
ferent regimes? 
The short-run effects we have covered in our modelling have 
led us to say that we doubt that the flexibility of reason re- 
quired by a Keynesian government exists. The two year time-lags 
in applying overall spending targets to the budgetary process, 
which should be obvious to any school boy who follows the formal 
charts, but which did not become clear to us until our models 
revealed the obvious, make short-term adjustment (a) untimely 
and (b) perverse. Our concern in the remainder of this section 
and the next, however, is not the short but the medium term, say 
five to fifteen years, long enough to experience more than a 
single set of economic conditions in one or more economic cycles. 
At least four separate relational activities between pairs 
of transactions must be monitored at the same time: expenditures 
are related to revenues, appropriations are related to outlays, 
executive and legislative actions are related to each other, and 
the public sector is related to the private. In considering each 
pair of related transactions, it is important to understand that 
efforts to achieve balance within a single relation have effects 
across them all. For example, changing the relative sizes of the 
public and private sectors may provide a solution to problems posed 
bv imJ2alances between expenditures and revenues. 
In our original studies2' three alternative equations were 
used to describe executive-legislative interaction within the 
b ~ d ~ e t a ; ~  process. The basic -- most frequently found -- equation 
is one (described above) where the Executive proposes and Congress 
disposes by granting some fixed proportion of the initial bid. 
Agencies mark up and Congress marks down. Over time a budgetary 
base is negotiated from which increases are proposed by agencies 
and reduced by Congress. Both actors fulfill their roles: 
agencies act as advocates by requesting more and Congress acts 
as guardian by giving less than was asked for but more than was 
received the prior year. Congress gets credit for cutting while 
agencies get more money for spending. This basic rule is most 
generally in force over the long expansive phase of the economic 
cycle. 
At the beginning of the cycle, with the economy in stagnation, 
however, government spending spurts ahead in a Keynesian attempt 
to induce the economy to follow, and a different pattern assumes 
prominence. Agency requests are less a function of what Congress 
previously granted and more a reflection of simply the agency's 
prior request. Support for spending is so strong that internal 
desires rather than external forces dominate. 
Eventually, to be sure, deficit-spending-induced inflation 
makes economic --and political--conditions change, bringing with 
them a desire to reduce spending. Enter the third alternative 
equation, with its gaming terms, in which Congress takes account 
of past patterns of requests and seeks to counter them. What 
happens? The rate of increase slows down but does not disappear. 
Every time period shows an increase in the base from which sub- 
sequent calculations are made. However the drastic effects of 
the resulting even short term excess of government revenues over 
expenditures inevitably lead to a sharp reversal of the anti- 
spending climate (with the effects outlined in the previous para- 
graph). Thus gaming must disappear to be eventually replaced by 
the ordinary relationships modelled by our basic equations. 
The alternative regimes effect different agencies --for ex- 
ample, agencies within and without the proportional cut mechanism 
20. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966), (1966), (19711, op. cit. 
a t  OMB - - d i f f e r e n t l y .  I n  t i m e  series a n a l y s e s  a c r o s s  s e v e r a l  
economic c y c l e s ,  such a s  o u r  e a r l y  s t u d i e s ,  w e  would t h e r e f o r e  
expec t  econometr ic  s e l e c t i o n  t e chn iques  t o  select non-basic 
d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  f o r  a g e n c i e s  whose budget h i s t o r i e s  w e r e  p r i n c i p -  
a l l y  determined by t h e  s h o r t e r  p e r i o d s  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  and end 
of t h e  government spending c y c l e s  when spending r a t e s  a r e  r a p i d l y  
a d j u s t e d .  These a r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  a g e n c i e s  most a b l e  t o  
i n c r e a s e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  and o u t l a y s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  expans ive  phases  
o f  a c y c l e  and t h o s e  most a b l e  t o  resist c u t s  i n  i n c r e a s e d  re- 
q u e s t s  du r ing  t h e  downturn when p u b l i c  expend i tu r e  must be s e v e r e l y  
r e s t r a i n e d .  
Why, t o  add o u r  r e f r a i n  t o  t h o s e  o f  many o t h e r s ,  does  spending 
n e v e r t h e l e s s  go up b u t  n o t  down? Everyone knows t h a t  programs 
develop c l i e n t e l e  who combine t o  resist t h e i r  d i s s o l u t i o n .  I t  
i s  n o t  s o  obvious  t h a t  t h e  i d e a s  o f  p r o g r e s s  and e q u a l i t y  combine 
t o  g e n e r a t e  programs t h a t  always i n c r e a s e  i n  s i z e .  P r o g r e s s  i s  
t r a n s l a t e d  t o  mean t h a t  no b e n e f i t  once c o n f e r r e d  may b e  e l i m i -  
na t ed  o r  reduced.  E q u a l i t y  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  no one 
who i s  q u a l i f i e d  should  be  r e j e c t e d  even i f  t h a t  means a l l owing  
i n  some people  who a r e  n o t .  Hence, when c o n s i d e r i n g  w e l f a r e  re- 
form, t h e  on ly  way o u t  of  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  i s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
s i z e  of t h e  program s o  a l l  w i l l  g e t  more. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
d e c r e a s e s  i n  spending c r e a t e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c i e s  
i n  governmental  agenc i e s .  Th i s  o c c u r s  n o t  o n l y  because  t h e y  a r e  
empire b u i l d e r s ,  o r  because  it h u r t s  t o  d i s a p p o i n t  c o l l e a g u e s  and 
c l i e n t e l e ,  b u t  because  o f  t h e  need f o r  e q u i t y  i n  i n t e r n a l  r e l a -  
t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  branch.  Agencies do  n o t  normal ly  con- 
t r o l  one a n o t h e r ,  even w i t h i n  t h e  same depar tments .  They l a c k  
l e v e r s  t o  a l t e r  each  o t h e r ' s  behav ior .  They cou ld ,  of cou r se ,  
a p p e a l  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  th rough  t h e  OMB b u t  t h a t  would be danger-  
ous;  OMB might prove h o s t i l e  t o  t h e i r  c ause  o r  undependable.  So 
it i s  f a r  s a f e r  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a l l i a n c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  bureaucracy.  
And whatever t h e  ba se s  o f  t h e s e  a l l i a n c e s ,  t h e y  must n o t  be based 
on m e r i t  because  no one e i t h e r  knows o r  i s  a b l e  t o  a g r e e  on t h a t .  
C e r t a i n l y  t h i s  is  what w e  found when w e  d i scove red  t h a t  o u r  i s o l a t e d  
agency models were i n  many c a s e s  inadequa te .  I n s t e a d ,  OMS a l l o -  
c a t e s  d e c r e a s e s ,  from agency a sk ing  p r i c e ,  by f a i r - s h a r e s .  
Should internal dislocations within the bureaucracy threaten 
to become severe, moreover, the burden of change can be shifted 
to the future or to the private sector or both. When Lyndon 
Johnson discovered the appropriation-outlay game, he was able to 
keep next yeart s expenditures under his $1 00 billion target in 
return for which future obligations were increased. Evoking the 
private sector is even easier because it requires no explicit 
decision. When expenditures increase faster than national product, 
and when substantial proportions are indexed against inflation, 
the money has to come from somewhere, namely, from a corresponding 
shrinkage of the private sector. 
In sum, there is no mechanism that compels a consideration 
of the relative merits of public policies or of the public or 
private sectors. In government, resource allocation has become 
resource addition. The consequences of this expansion of ex- 
penditure for the economic cycle are now becoming clear. 
3. THE ENDOGENOUS GOVERNMENT : FORGET KEYNES 
A touch of recession makes the whole world Keynesian. 
Professor Herbert Stein 
It's like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. 
Anon. Congressman 
We now turn to a brief analysis of the effects of public 
spending in generating an economic cycle, using a simple macro- 
economic model developed previously. 21 The distinctive feature 
of this model of momentary macroeconomic equilibrium --in contrast 
to both its eclectic Keynesian and Monetarist equivalents --is 
that in comparative static analysis it is capable of generating 
the range of behavior exhibited by the U.S. economy, including 
stagflation, in the various regimes of the cycle. Our present 
21.  M.A.H. Dempster, A crude model of the modern economy, Center 
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 
California ( 1  9 7 5 )  . Revised January (1 976)  ; M.A.H. Dempster 
and'Otto A. Davis, On macro-economics: Comparative statics, 
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 
June ( 1 9 7 5 ) .  Revised January ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  
purpose is merely to outline the dynamics of the economic cycle 
resulting from the mutual interaction of the economy and polity, 
from the theoretical --i.e. model--viewpoint. The construction 
of a full dynamic model reproducing the public policy induced 
economic cycle is left to future work. 
In recent times, Professor Friedman has revived a sophist- 
icated version of the original quantity theory of money which 
holds that the only effective policy instrument in the hands of 
the government is the control of the money supply. Although 
there has been much debate between the Neo-Keynesian and Monetarist 
schools of macroeconomic theorists, a popular conclusion is that 
neither addresses the problems of the modern economy. 22 
Table 4 sets out the comparative static version of a model 
of the macro economy which attempts to synthesize and extend 
recent eclectic Keynesian and Monetarist views in light of the 
findings reported in previous sections of this paper. The ac- 
companying Table 5 lists the variables and exogenous parameters 
in this model of short term macroeconomic equilibrium. The model 
explicitly attempts to represent at the macro level the productive 
sector of the economy, the government expenditure process, and 
the behavior of the central banking authorities and the private 
banking sector. Debt financing, open market operations, trade 
balance and foreign capital transfers influence real activity 
and inflation through the money and stock markets. The six equa- 
tions determining real output, investment, employment, profit, 
the price level, and the interest rate have previously been ana- 
lyzed with respect to both domestic policy parameters and the 
effects of the global economy as represented in the balance of 
payments and net foreign capital transfers. 23 The analysis of 
the productive sector is essentially neoclassical with the excep- 
tion that the wage rate is allowed to depend on the price level 
22. cf. Walter W. Heller, !*at's right with economics? Presi- 
dential address to the American Economic Association, San 
Francisco, December 29, 1974. 
The reader is referred to ~avis & Dempster (1975), op.cit., 
for details. For a discussion of related research see 
J.P. Crecine, M.A.H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky, Budgets, 
bureaucrats and the Executive: Influences on the size of 
the public sector, to appear in Proceedings of the Conference 
on the Causes ar.d Consequences of Public Sector Growth, Dorado 
Beach, Puerto Rico, Nov. 1-5, 1978, P. Aranson & P. Ordeshook, 
eds. 
Table 4  
A Macroeconomic Mode 2 with Endogenous GovernmentaZ 
mrd Productive Sectors 
Production 
Product ion func t ion :  Y = fC(1-6)K + I, N1 
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  p r o f i t :  Pn = PY - r P I  - w(P)N - r(1-d)PK (1  
Investment equation: f K ( I ,  N) = r ( 2 )  
Employment equation: PfN( I ,  N) = w(P) ( 3 )  
Expenditure 
Nat iona l  income i d e n t i t y :  
Y = c(Y-T, W )  + I ( r ,  P) + G + X/P + F/P ( 4 )  
Tax f u n c t i  on : T = t(PY; T) /P  
Government expenditure: G = g(py, u; y)/P 
Government income i d e n t i t y :  G = T + A (5) 
Capita l  and Money Markets 
Stock Market index: S = s(n, Y, r, P; X, F) 
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  weal t h  : 
M B W = [ ( I - 6 )K  + I1 + (F + PVA) + [ ( I - p )  vA + -1 
r P 
Demand f o r  money: 
L = t (Y ,  W )  + n ( s )  I = e(Y, r, P; X, F) 
Supply o f  money 
B M/P = m(r, P, ~ ( 1 - D ) A  + -, PA, A; F, p ,  R) = M(r, P, Y ;  A, F)/P 
r P 
Money market equ i l i b r i um :  M(r, P, Y; A,  F)/P = e(Y, r, P; X, F) ( 6 )  
Source: Davis & Dempster (1975), 9p.cit. 
Subscr ipts i n  ( 2 )  and ( 3 )  denote p a r t i a l  de r i va t i ves .  
Table 5 
Parameters and Variables o f  the Macroeconomic Model 
Gi ven : 
K - existing capital stock, 
8 - rate of capital depreciation, 
No-  work force, 
X - net exports, 
F - net foreign capital t ransfers,  
T - gross tax rate,  
- level of government act iv i ty ,  
A - real government def ic i t ,  
v - proportion of new government debt he1 d domestically, 
p - proportion of new government debt monetized, 
B - existing stock of government bonds, 
x - open market act ivi ty 1 evel , 
p - rediscount ra te ,  
R - reserve requirement, 
the s ix  equations (1-6) of Table 4 determine the s ix  variables: 
1 .  I - real investment, 
2. N - employment (or  unemployment, U = N o  - N )  , 
3 .  Y - real G N P ,  
4.  rr - real p rof i t ,  
5. r - in te res t  ra te ,  
6. P - price 1 evel ( G N P  def 1 a tor ) .  
in order to represent collective bargaining processes. This 
analysis allows a consideration of output, investment and unem- 
ployment in terms of the relative effects of the price level and 
the rate of interest on capital and labor intensities at (momen- 
tary) equilibrium. A by-product is an analysis of the conditions 
under which the Phillips curve can be expected to hold locally 
about the current position of the economy. 
Although the textbook national income identity supplemented 
by a tax function representing a progressive tax structure in 
nominal GNP is retained, the standard government expenditure 
parameter has been replaced with a government expenditure func- 
tion based on our findings. We argue that the lags in fiscal 
policy are such that, barring a major change in government activ- 
ity level, government expenditure is better modelled as reacting 
to nominal  GNP --which incorporates both real and price effects -- 
and unemployment. 
The modelling of the capital markets is radically different 
from that generally accepted by both Keynesian and Monetarist 
schools of macro-economics. Although the implicit treatment of 
the bond market as moving in parallel with the stock market is 
retained, the stock market index, reacting to the natural finan- 
cial and real variables, is introduced explicitly as the principal 
determinant in the demand for money (including credit) for invest- 
ment in new capital. This demand has replaced the standard 
Keynesian speculative demand for money, which here appears on the 
supply side of the money market equation. The demand for money 
term in the model of Table 4 is, through the stock market, a major 
link between financial and productive sectors of the economy. 
The treatment of the supply of money intimately links the response 
of the money market, and hence the economy, to the marginal re- 
sponses of taxation and government expenditures to changes in 
nominal GNP. 
The response of the model to changes in the major public 
policy parameters is capable of exhibiting a wealth of behaviors 
ranging from the classical to the target behavior of both the 
Keynesian and Monetarist schools of macro-economics. With regard 
to the controversy between these two Schools, the most important 
parameters of Table 5 are: the gross tax rate T ,  the level of 
government activity parameter y 24, the real government deficit A, 
the open market activity parameter h and the proportion of new 
government debt monetized v .  The proportion of new government 
debt held domestically v is probably outside the government's 
control, and would in any event probably be taken as exogenous. 
When the U.S. Government has large deficits, it is very important 
how much of this new debt can be sold to the public as govern- 
ment securities and how much must be sold to the Federal Reserve, 
debt which will then, eventually at least, find its way into the 
money supply. 
Analysis of the model shows that its behavior in response 
to changes in policy parameters can be divided into four regimes 
determined by the relative sizes of three parameters: the ratios 
of the marginal responses of real activity and the money market 
to real output Y, the interest rate r, and the price level P. 
The marginal response of the money market to changes in these 
variables is in terms of the excess demand for money; the marginal 
response of real activity in each case is more complicated. Under 
a reasonable set of further assumptions the behavior of the model 
in the four regimes follows. 
The first regime corresponds to the classical economy, while 
the second regime corresponds in one mode to the extreme Keynesian 
view of the world and displays in the other mode the unpleasant 
modern phenomenon of stagflation. In this and the remaining two 
regimes --which are of central interest for the effects of public 
spending on the economic cycle --the response of investment, un- 
employment, and profit to government spending will depend on the 
behavior of the wage rate with respect to the price level. 
The third regime provides a description of the performance 
of western economies during the early post-war period. In this 
situation, real GNP, the price level and the interest rate move 
together in response to policy variables. This is the model 
24. Note that by this parameter we model, not the month-to-month 
demand tuning of theoretical Yeynesian macroeconomics, but 
rather the major changes in Federal Government activity levels 
induced by wars and such programs as Johnson's Great Society 
and NASA's Lunar Landings. 
regime c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  b u s i n e s s  c y c l e ;  r e a l  growth 
i s  accompanied by i n f l a t i o n  and a n  i n c r e a s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  
w h i l e  r e a l  d e c l i n e  i s  accompanied by a f a l l i n g  o f  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  
and i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  Although a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  government a c t i v i t y  
o r  t h e  money s u p p l y  o c c a s i o n s  growth i n  r e a l  G N P ,  it i s  accom- 
pan ied  by a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  b o t h  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  and t h e  r a t e  of  
i n t e r e s t .  Converse ly ,  t h e  t i g h t e n i n g  o f  t h e  money s u p p l y  de- 
c r e a s e s  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  and t h e  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t ,  b u t  o n l y  a t  
t h e  expense  of a d e c l i n e  i n  r e a l  GNP. 
I n  t h e  f o u r t h  reg ime ,  t h e  model d i s p l a y s  i n  one  mode --when 
t h e  m a r g i n a l  r e s p o n s e  of  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  t o  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  
government d e f i c i t  i s  n e g a t i v e  - - t h e  b e h a v i o r  which h a s  been t h e  
t a r g e t  of  Keynesian f i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  post-war p e r i o d ;  i n  t h e  
o t h e r  - - t h a t  o f  p o s i t i v e  p r i c e  l e v e l  r e s p o n s e  t o  d e f i c i t  i n c r e -  
ments  --it a g a i n  d i s p l a y s  t h e  s t a g f l a t i o n a r y  r e s p o n s e .  
W e  have s e e n  t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  model economy t o  changes  
i n  t h e  p o l i c y  p a r a m e t e r s  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  e x h i b i t i n g  a r a n g e  o f  be- 
h a v i o r .  U n l i k e  t h e  s t a n d a r d  t e x t b o o k  a n a l y s e s ,  however, o u r  ana- 
l y s i s  shows t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  domes t i c  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  w i l l  
be r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  depending on t h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
pa ramete r s .  The e f f e c t s  o f  monetary  p o l i c y  have been s e e n  t o  
depend on t h e  r e l a t i v e  magni tudes  of  t h e  m a r g i n a l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
t a x a t i o n  and government spend ing  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  nominal  GNP -- 
i . e .  n e t  m a r g i n a l  ( n o m i n a l )  government  i m p a c t .  I n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
t h a t  m a r g i n a l  government spend ing  exceeds  m a r g i n a l  government 
t a x a t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  nominal  G N P ,  w e  may e x p e c t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
s h a r e  of government e x p e n d i t u r e  i n  GNP t o  grow w i t h  t h e  growth 
of  t h e  economy, however growth  i s  i n d u c e d .  
W e  have r e p o r t e d  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s h o r t  
t e r m  e q u i l i b r i u m  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  s o l u t i o n  of t h e  model t o  p o l i c y  
p a r a m e t e r s  one  a t  a t i m e .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  of c o u r s e ,  t h e y  a r e  moved 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  - - o f t e n  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  e a c h  o t h e r .  I n  t h e  model 
t h e  marg ina l  e f f e c t s  of  t h e s e  p a r a m e t e r s  may b e  added,  b u t ,  even  
i f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  t a r g e t  r eg imes  o f  b o t h  Keynesian and 
M o n e t a r i s t  Schoo l s  a r e  m e t ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  government 
e x p e n d i t u r e  c o u l d  b e  overwhelmed by a t i g h t e n i n g  o f  t h e  money 
s u p p l y  t o  produce  a d e c l i n e  i n  r e a l  GNP. A s i m i l a r  o c c u r r e n c e  
with regard to relative r a t e s  of growth--when money supply ex- 
pansion was insufficient to fund Korean War defense expenditures -- 
was probably responsible for the 'pause' in the growth of the 
U.S. economy in 1953-54, see Figure 1. 25 
The next such period, in 1957-58, was again the result of 
fiscal and monetary policy operating in conditions valid for the 
target regimes of both Keynesian and Monetarist Schools. Eisenhower, 
in an attempt to reverse the increments in the public debt due 
to Korea and to Keynesian expansionary policy during the post 
Korean War recession, operated a tight fiscal policy throughout 
the next business cycle boom --actually running a Federal surplus 
from early 1955 through 1957. In the second half of this period, 
tight fiscal policy was roughly balanced by counteracting expan- 
sionary monetary policy. Early in 1957, however, in order to 
stop the inflation generated by an overheating economy, money 
supply growth was reversed --to intially halt growth in the third 
quarter of 1957 and send the economy into recession in the fourth. 
The steady growth and mild inflation over the period 1961-65 
(prior to the start of the 1966-70 cycle) was the only period in 
post-war U.S. economic history in which not only were conditions 
for the achievement of the medium t e r m  target regimes of both 
Keynesian and Monetarist policies valid, but economic stabiliza- 
tion was broadly achieved. Nevertheless, under steady bureau- 
cratic and political pressure for expansion throughout the period -- 
Federal government expenditures grew in real terms over the longer 
term. 
The remaining three recessionary periods --1960-61, 1969-70 
and 1974-75 --were consequences of an economic cycle induced by 
public spending. Now we shall attempt a general description of 
the two principal phases of such a cycle in terms of appropriate 
modes of the third and fourth regimes of the short term macro- 
economic model of Table 4. Beginning as a response to recession- 
ary conditions --as in 1961 or 1970 --or autonomously through 
Presidential policy --as in 1966 --both fiscal and monetary policy 
is strongly expansionary. This early point in the cycle is 
modelled by regime three of the model in which real GNP, the price 
25. Recessionary periods are shown shaded in the graphs of 
Figure 1. 
level, and the interest rate move upward together, since effective 
marginal wage escalation due to collective bargaining is small, 
while net marginal nominal government impact--the excess of 
government expenditure over receipts at the margin --is strongly 
positive. The second half of this first phase --still in model 
regime three --is characterized by increasing inflation, due to 
the response of the price level to the effects of expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy and to accelerating wage claims. In 
model terms, effective marginal wage escalation is increasing, 
while net marginal government impact is declining due to the 
interaction of inflation with the progressive tax structure to 
raise tax take relative to less rapidly expanding government ex- 
penditures --to produce a Federal budget surplus. These stringent 
fiscal policy measures are reinforced by a contraction of the 
money supply, cf. Figure 1 (1960, 1969 and 1974). By this time, 
exaggerated claims (justified by inflation) have escalated wages, 
while the increment of tax take over that of government spending 
in current dollars has increased. In model terms, these are the 
conditions for regime four in which the marginal price level 
response to expansionary fiscal or monetary policy is negative. 
If fiscal and monetary controls were to be relaxed at this point 
in the cycle, real economic expansion and price stabilization 
would result. 26 Since, however, both fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments are strongly restrictive at this point in the cycle 
in a vain and mistimed attempt to counteract inflation, the 
result --both in the model and the real world --is stagflation, 
a simultaneous decline in real activity, accompanied by increased 
interest rates, and continuing inflation. 
The current dissatisfaction with economic management is 
amply justified. Economists have not been of much help to the 
economy. Standard theories do not work and alternatives are not 
much better. By the time econometric models are perfected they 
26. In the above model analysis the interaction of domestic 
policy and international trade and financial considerations 
has of course been ignored through taking the latter (X, F 
and v of Table 5) as fixed. In this regard see H. Sneesons, 
Inflation in Western economies, CORE Discussion Paper 7819, 
Universite Catholique de Louvain, May (1978). 
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appear as relics of a bygone era. The main problem, as we con- 
ceive it, is that most existing models do not generate a suffi- 
cient variety of behavior. 27 Therefore when a new situation 
occurs, the result is to discredit existing models, and what is 
worse, economic analysis. By bringing in a wider variety of con- 
siderations --from the presence of the production sector of the 
economy to the impracticality of manipulating totals of govern- 
ment spending and the necessity of marketing the government debt-- 
the present model generates a wide enough variety of economic 
behaviors to be appropriate to the historical conditions experi- 
enced by real economies in different regimes. 
Political and bureaucratic pressures for increased govern- 
ment spending are omnipresent. As inflation accelerates towards 
the end of the expansionary phase of the cycle, it has become 
common practice for the Executive to indulge in much rhetoric 
concerning wage and price guidelines, policies, controls, etc. 
This is always a vain attempt to stem the wage and price in- 
creases which are natural consequences --captured in the model-- 
of the inflation which the Administration has itself induced. 
As the government initially spends rapidly to rise from a recession, 
it must market its debt and thus eventually expand the money supply. 
Wages, which had been near their marginal product, increase as 
the cost of living goes up. Fearing inflation the government 
seeks to cut spending and restrict the money supply. At the same 
time, however, taxes are going up due to inflation, so there is 
less apparent need to close the gap and spending is, in any event, 
difficult to reduce. When restrictive action is finally required, 
it must be all the more severe. Each time the cycle is repeated, 
the spending level is higher. Currently, government has become 
so to speak, the nation's largest firm, to which other firms have 
adjusted so that a substantial reduction in governmental demand 
has serious economic consequences. Nevertheless, throughout the 
post World War I1 period, virtually steady growth in the relative 
size of the public sector has been the long term result. 
27. An exception to this statement is presented by models of 
constrained economic equilibria, but these have so far failed 
to handle dynamic considerations satisfactorily and in any 
event appear to us to rest on a very thin empirical base. 
4. THE LONG RUN: RECALL SCHUMPETER, MISES AND HAYEK 
In the previous section we used a momentary, i.e., short 
term macro-economic model to analyze the medium term public policy 
induced economic cycle. In this final section of our paper we 
attempt to identify the longer term effects of the growth of the 
bureaucratic public sector. 
Consider first the behavior of the empirically based models 
of the Federal budget/expenditure process set out in Section 2  
(equations 1-5). We have seen in Section 2  that the magnitudes 
of the fundamental Executive markup and Congressional markdown 
for an agency's appropriation are subject to periodic ratchet 
adjustments to keep an agency's expenditures on a politically 
expedient course. The implication is that bureaucratic momentum -- 
in the face of complexity and uncertainty--keeps the budgeting 
behavior of the relevant process participants stationary until 
the organizationally perceived penalties for failure to act ex- 
ceed the combined costs of search and changeover involved in the 
adaptation to a new budget path. 
For the participants on the Congressional side of the budget 
process, this pressure for change largely manifests itself at 
times of partisan changes in the Presidency and the composition 
of the House and Senate. At these epochs, significant internal 
political costs are attached to maintaining the s t a t u s  quo a n t e .  
Partisan forces, together with medium term fiscal policy consider- 
ations, are also present as environmental influences on the Ex- 
ecutive. But there is an additional necessity for periodic change 
i n h e r e n t  in the use of the proportional cut as a fair Executive 
allocation/coordination mechanism for agency requests. The pro- 
portional cut mechanism has since 1921  doubtless saved consider- 
ably the time of Congressional appropriations committees in 
relieving them from 'exploding the visionary schemes of bureau 
chiefs for which no administration would be willing to stand 
responsible'. 2 8  In conjunction with the other decision rules it 
has however the unacceptable property that if left to run its 
course over the years in an era of expanding total expenditure, 
the largest budget unit would eventually swallow the total. 
2 8 .  H. Rept.No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4. 
Clearly, periodic adjustment to such a dynamically unbalanced 
inter-agency coordinating mechanism is a matter of organization- 
al necessity. It should therefore not be surprising that the 
opportunity will be taken at times of partisan and other environ- 
mental change to move agencies across the boundaries of the pro- 
portional cut or to otherwise bring its allocative results back 
on the currently expendient course. 
Notice that what we have called the gaming term in the 
equations governing the demand and supply of an agency's appro- 
priations --i.e. the difference between the previous years ap- 
propriation and agency request--has the stabilizing effect of 
distributing periodic major shocks across both sides of the 
process. However, nothing serves to permanently change the con- 
tinual pressure for growth embodied in inflated agency requests 
and only partial Congressional pruning of the resulting incre- 
ment, represented in the model by the time varying leading co- 
efficients of the equations. That this phenomenon is another 
undesirable consequence of the proportional cut allocation mech- 
anism --coupled with the limited review capability of the central 
budget organization (OPIB) --has been pointed out by Shubik in his 
game theoretic analysis of an executive budget process. 29 
Taken together, the properties of the process represented 
by the models of Section 2 imply relatively infrequent adjust- 
ments of their incremental growth dynamics to partisan changes, 
Presidential ambitions and the periodic (mistaken or, at least 
mistimed) anti-inflationary fiscal stringencies which form part 
of the public policy induced business cycle. In summary, we have 
seen that from the short term point of view the growth of govern- 
ment has been the engine of the growth of economy. 30 When the 
intertemporal credit represented by a deficit in its operations 
is too large, inflation results; when this credit is called in, 
29. Shubik (19701, op.cCt. 
30. It is interesting to note that the necessity for this state 
of affairs was explicitly argued by Alvin H. Hansen in the 
late 40's, see Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, 
Simon & Schuster, New York (19611, Chapt. 10. Hansen saw 
underlying population growth --Harrod's 'warranted' growth -- 
as insufficient to allow capitalist industrial economies to 
continue to expand. But this view ignores the role of tech- 
nical progress and the possibility of a service, versus a 
goods, based economy. 
recession --with continuing inflati~n --is the consequence. This 
is a government expenditure induced 'business' cycle. President 
Carter is at the time of writing keeping silent on the present 
rapid speedup in Federal outlays to counter the effects of the 
current recession. Meanwhile, pre-election Congressional economic 
policy debate centres on "necessary" upwards revision of the 
Federal bud-get deficit for the fiscal year (1981) beginning on 
1st October and the Federal Reserve has completely reversed its 
tight money policy of the first two quarters. Inflation continues 
unabated. 
Consider next the long run. The perception that competitive 
markets operate dynamicaZZy like a Darwinian biological selection 
environment for firms --supporting the survival of sufficiently 
adaptive variants and leading to the demise of the remainder -- 
was explicit in the writings of many of the great 19th century 
economic theorists. In the first half of this century the evolu- 
tionary approach to competition was clearly set out by Schumpeter, 
Mises and Hayek. 31 More recently, this view of market processes 
has been re-emphasized in a number of articles by Nelson and 
Winter, who have summarized it variously as follows: - 
In a stylized Schumpeterian evolutionary system, 
there is both a carrot and a stick to motivate firms 
to introduce 'better' production methods or products. 
Better here has an unambiguous meaning: lower cost 
of production, or a product that consumers are willing 
to buy at a price above cost. In either case the 
criterion boils down to higher monetary profit. Success- 
ful innovation leads to both higher profit for the 
innovator and to profitable investment opportunities. 
Thus profitable firms grow. In so doing they cut away 
the market for the noninnovators and reduce their 
profitability which, in turn, will force these firms 
to contract. Both the visible profits of the innovators 
and the losses experienced by the laggers stimulate 
the latter to try to imitate.32 
31. See, for example: Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic 
DeveZopment, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1934), and 
Capitalism, SociaZism and Dem~c~acy, Harper E Pow, New York 
(1950); Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, Yale University Press, 
New Haven (1949); and Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom, Chicago University Press, Chicago (1944). For an 
elegantly succinct statement of this dynamic --as opposed to 
the static neoclassical relative price --role of the market, 
see Hayek's Chapter 12, Competition as a discovery procedure, 
in his New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and 
the History of Ideas, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1978). 
32. Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In search of useful 
theory of innovation, Research Policy 6 (1977), 36-76, p.64. 
Hayek proposed that the central problem of 
economic organization was to respond to change -- 
change in demands, change in factor supply con- 
ditions. He argued that a socialist regime ... 
would be slow and cumbersome in response. To get 
rapid response one needs 'real' markets, real 
profit incentives. It should be emphasized that 
his argument was not about 'optimality'; it was 
about effective and speedy adaptation. This is 
not what the theory of modern welfare economics 
including that concerning public goods is about. 
Note also that Hayek was not arguing that the 
competitive market system was ideal in any sense. 
Rather, he was implicitly arguing th demerits 
of large governmental bureaucracies. 43 [Italics 
added I 
Bureaucratic process innovation is closely related to changes in 
the nature of government provision of goods and services for short 
term consumption, while product innovation in government relates 
to research, development and construction activities involved in 
longer term investment in energy production, aerospace, medical 
and educational technology, etc. As is the tendency in the pri- 
vate sector --but to the considerably greater extent demonstrated 
by the empirical models of Section 4 --bureaucratic process in- 
novation is shielded from environmental influences and must result, 
when it does, from internal pressures. On the other hand, while 
external influences must eventually determine innovation and change 
in the longer term investment activities of government, just as 
in the market sector, the interaction of the political decision 
making process with the slow reacting bureaucratic dynamic must 
alone tend to reduce adaptability. 
How might selection be introduced into the expenditure process? 
Are there structural changes which, when introduced, would lead 
to less inflationary outcomes? We have seen that intertemporal 
opportunity cost considerations, giving up something now for what 
you get later, are not effective in government over long time 
periods. More for one agency and program need not, over time, 
lead to less for another. The problem, to paraphrase an earlier 
comment, is how to make allocation over time more like subtraction 
and less like addition. 
33. Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Firm and industry re- 
sponse to changed market conditions: An evolutionary approach, 
Ins. for Social and Policy Research Working Paper No. 788, 
Yale University, January (19781, p. 29. 
The most direct approach to a less inflationary expenditure 
process would be to prevent spending from exceeding productivity 
by limiting it to a fixed proportion of Gross National Product, 
or some other more appropriate measure. Assuming such a limit 
could or would be enforced (big assumptions that we will not go 
into here) it would give outside interests a stake in productivity 
as well as distribution since the latter would depend on the former. 
Inside the bureaucracy, an expenditure limitation would create a 
strong disincentive against inflationary measures. For whenever 
the inflation rate exceeded productivity increases, the effective 
purchasing power of governmental agencies would decline. At the 
limit, something new would have to displace something old. Fair- 
shares would be less likely to operate within a context of de- 
clining real resources; internal conflict within the Executive 
would be intensified. Another way of saying this is that collu- 
sion would be replaced by competition. Instead of regarding 
policy evaluation as an external excrescence ,ignored when possible 
and distorted when not, interest in efficiency would grow, as 
would efforts to uncover weaknesses in other agency's programs. 
Logrolling, whether in the legislature or the Executive, would 
continue, of course, but in a new competitive context; each co- 
alition would not only augment returns to its members but suggest 
decreases in returns to others. There would be less internal 
harmony and more information for outsiders. 
Obviously, the stability of spending agencies would be im- 
paired. One way of looking at it is that their bureaucratic 
instability is our citizen stability. Another point of view, 
since 'they' are also 'us' acting in a collective capacity, is 
that agencies need a stable environment in which to carry out our 
desires. If spending patterns are to change so as to smooth out 
the economic cycle described above, instability has to be allo- 
cated like any other good. Perhaps sufficient has been said here, 
however, to suggest that government spending is not the world's 
best or most flexible instrument for short-term economic manage- 
ment. Varying the tax take is surer and swifter, though of course 
also subject to political pressures. Were spending totals fixed 
relative to national product, it would be easier to agree that 
social issues involving spending thus constrained should be argued 
on their relative merits. Without worrying about the possibility 
that avaricious spending would devour the national patrimony, it 
may be possible to secure stability in spending for socially de- 
sirable objects. 
